argue that critically revisiting feminist notions of agency, autonomy and desire, is necessary in order to understand the kinds of self-realization that these women aspire to. However, the article argues against positing Muslim conceptions and techniques of the self as 'the other' of liberal-secular traditions. Rather, I show how configurations of personhood, ethics and self-realization drawn from Islamic and liberal-secular discursive formations inhabit not only the same cultural and historical space, but also shape individual subjectivities and modes of agency. introduction More than twenty years ago, Marilyn Strathern (1987: 87) pointed out th awkward relationship between feminism and anthropology. If we add religion, w face a no less awkward and even more troublesome threesome. As Sarah Bracke (2008: 52) notes, 'the gender politics of the "return of religion" intensively interpellates European feminist thought, with its largely secular roots'. This is nowhere more evident than in what Saba Mahmood (2005) calls 'the vexing relationship' between feminism and Islam, which is due, in part, to the historically contentious relationship between the 'West' and 'Islamic societies', but also to the challenges that contemporary Islamist movements seem to pose to secularliberal politics of which feminism has been an integral, if critical, part. While feminist anthropology has, for some time, contributed to questioning ethnocentric accounts of Muslim women, not least through 'thick' ethnographic accounts, many such accounts have nevertheless been significantly influenced by the secular-liberal politics, which has also informed much anthropological thinking (see Moore, 1994) . Given the awkward relationship between feminism and the 'return of religion', women's participation in and support for the Islamic revival in its various manifestations has caused both unease and spurred attempts at theorizing, which can account for such participation and support. To a large extent, theorizing has focused on the question of the freedom and autonomy of the subjects engaged in Islamic practices (Mahmood, 2001a; Ismail, 2007) .
In this article, I draw on ethnographic material from my own research among young Muslim women in Norway to investigate some challenges that researching religious subjectivities and practices pose to feminist theory in general, and anthropology in particular. How should we understand young Norwegian women's engagement in Islamic revivalism?2 What are the forms of subjectivity and agency involved in such engagement? In pondering these questions I draw both on a reflection of my own positioning as a scholar in the field over time, and on theoretical debates on women's piety in feminism and anthropology. In particular, I engage with the work of Mahmood (2005) and her efforts to conceptualize agency in a way that moves beyond the confines of the binary model of subordination and resistance and that detaches agency from the goals of feminist politics. The Norwegian context is of course very different from the Egyptian, and the importance that Mahmood attributes to historically specific conditions of subject formation should caution us against reading her work as a general model of Muslim women's piety (see Bautista, 2008: 81) . The modes of inquiry into religious subjectivities and practices developed by Mahmood may nevertheless contribute to our understanding of young Norwegian women's engagement in Islamic revivalism. However, in the Norwegian context at least, the forms of subjectivities and relationships that are enabled should not be constructed as 'the other' of secular-liberal politics. Rather, as I will attempt to demonstrate, the subjectivities and particularity of the agency of the women I worked 66 feminist review 98 2011 troublesome threesome was, in line with many feminist anthropologists at the time, a wish to place women at the centre of my inquiry, and to see them not only as victims of patriarchal structures and norms, but also as actors in their own lives. In Oslo, I
followed two inter-ethnic and mixed-gender Muslims' youth and student groups, attended mainly by descendants of Pakistani, Turkish and North-African labour migrants, as well as by descendants of refugees and asylum seekers from across the Muslim world. The youth and student organizations, oriented as they were primarily towards the challenges of living as a Muslim in Norwegian society, but also towards a transnational Islamic umma, professed a 'return' to Islam based on the scriptures, as opposed to Muslim practices associated with the 'cultural traditions' of the parental generation.4 My studies showed how the criticism of these latter practices served to challenge cultural ized representation of 'Muslim immigrants' in the Norwegian majority population, that have since the 1990s, as elsewhere in Europe been largely negative and problem oriented. They also showed that young adult's engagement with revivalist Islamic discourses allowed them to challenge gendered and other regimes of power within the ethnic and religious migrant communities (e.g. Jacobsen, 2002 Jacobsen, , 2004 Jacobsen, , 2006 . Like numerous studies from across Europe (Gaspard and Khosrokhavar, 1995; Khosrokhavar, 1997; Jacobson, 1998; Amiraux, 2001; Tietze, 2002; Saint-Blancat, 2004) , my studies of young Muslims in Oslo showed how religious argumentations were used against women-unfriendly 'traditional' practices, and how an engagement with the Islamic tradition allowed young women to negotiate intergenerational gender issues across numerous social fields (in the organizations, in the family, in marriage).
When I started my second round of fieldwork with these groups in 2002, I felt that something was missing from my analysis. I had assumed Islam to fulfil a certain role that could be explained in terms of the young women's desire to be free from relations of subordination (including structures of male and majority domination). Also, I tended to search for women's agency in the ways in which they challenged or strove to re-signify religious traditions, and in which they (Mahmood, 2005: 21 Roy (2004) , Schmidt (2002 Schmidt ( , 2005 .
bias that had prevented me from getting an understanding of some of the goods and motives that the young sought to realize through their religious engagement.
I recognized the need to understand the subjectivities and practices of young Muslims also in terms of the visions of self, social relations and society that was offered to them by the Islamic discursive tradition (Asad, 1986 (Asad, , 1993 as mediated in religious lectures, Islamic literature, audio-visual edificatory material, and by parents, friends and religious leaders. My interest was thus increasingly drawn towards the kinds of subjects that these religious discourses presupposed, and the subjectivities that were shaped as young Muslims invested in a religious subject-position.
At this point I was faced with new challenges in understanding women's participation in the Muslim youth and student organizations in question, and their attraction to Islamic revivalist discourses. How was I to explain the moments when subversion and redeployment of religious concepts and practices was not the goal of the women I talked to -when they focused instead on submission to religious norms and emulation of authoritative religious figures?
Or, when they at times naturalized and authorized complementary essentializing gender constructions with reference to Islamic ideals (see Amir-Moazami and Salvatore, 2003) ? I will address these questions first by engaging some theoretical perspectives on women's religious piety and secondly by means of an ethnographic case that will be discussed in terms of (and in turn allow me to further engage the theoretical approaches to piety) self and religious practice.
While the ethnographic case is used in a somewhat 'anecdotal' manner to draw out some of the issues I am concerned with in this article, the analysis as such builds on extensive fieldwork and interviewing among young Muslims in Oslo over a period of more than ten years.5 theorizing women's piety
The complexity of women's religious piety and the crafting of religious selves have been recurrent topics in feminist theology and feminist research on women and religion more generally (see, for example, Gross, 1996) . A wide range of literature has explored the complexity of gender relations and women's engagement in various revivalist and/or fundamentalist religious movements (Sahgal and YuvalDavis, 1992; Harding, 2000; Bracke, 2003; Deeb, 2006; Stadler, 2009) . In Norway, a number of works deal with the historical involvement of women in the various Protestant pious movements that have been so influential in Scandinavia (Predelli, 2001 (Predelli, , 2003 Okkenhaug, 2003) . While feminist readings initially emphasized patriarchy and the naturalization of gender hierarchy professed by these movements, more recent studies have shown that women were also actively taking part in these movements and that their participation contributed significantly to the entrance of women in the public domain (Okkenhaug, 2003) . The same shift towards an increasing emphasis of women's agency can be noted in the literature on the Islamic revival. Here, the view that women passively adapt to Islamist revivalist movements was challenged by authors who 'start from the women's perspective' and in various ways attempt to show how women participate in processes where norms are opened up and renegotiated -enlarging women's room to manoeuvre (Ask and Tjomsland, 1998) .
A perspective that has contributed significantly to the body of scholarship on feminism and Islam, challenging both accounts of Muslim women's engagement in revivalist Islam, in terms of victimhood and oppression, and their re-reading in terms of resistance and emancipation, was developed by Saba Mahmood.
Mahmood's perspective has been crucial to theorizing women's piety in the Arab world but also in Europe and South East Asia (jacobsen, 2006; Jouili, 2006; Minganti, 2007; Scott, 2007; Bracke, 2008; Fadil, 2008; Turner and Tong, 2008) . A central concern to Mahmood (2001a Mahmood ( , b, 2003 Mahmood ( , 2005 is that the liberal-progressive agenda undergirding feminist theorizing on freedom, agency and the human subject limits the ability to comprehend women's piety in its complexity. Attempting to parochialize key assumptions in feminist theory and liberal accounts of politics, Mahmood draws on Foucault's studies of ethics as a point of departure for analysing pious Muslim women's subjectivities and practices. Foucault describes 'ethics' as the dimension of moral prescriptions that relates to 'the kind of relationship that you ought to have with yourself', and which 'determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions' (Foucault, 1997: 263) .
Mahmood demonstrates how, within the context of the Egyptian piety movement she studied, religious practices such as veiling and praying fit into a broader process of self-fashioning and remodelling of one's affects and interiority. The revivalist movement has a strong individualizing impetus, she argues, in that there are no centralized authorities that enforce the moral code and penalize infractions, but rather a requirement for each person to adopt a set of ascetic practices for shaping moral conduct (Mahmood, 2005: 30 ).
Mahmood's analysis of processes of self-formation engaged by women in the Mosque movement resonates with anthropological concerns with the cultural construction of personhood. Her argument is that the conception of self among the women she studied differs from, and can not be fully grasped in terms of, liberal-secularist conceptions of the self that prevail in Western modernity and undergird feminist accounts of Muslim women's participation in the Islamic revival. In order to understand the religious practices of pious Muslim women, Mahmood suggests, 'self-fulfilment' needs to be dissociated from 'autonomy'.
The women she worked with acquired a level of self-fulfilment not by referring to 'autonomy-discourses' but rather by 'subjugating themselves' to religious prescriptions. Mahmood's use of the concept 'piety' can be read as a 'counterconceptual idea' that is juxtaposed with concepts of freedom and autonomy, as Critics have argued that the empiricism of Mahmood's method lends itself to the same kind of cultural essentialism she has sought to avoid, by fixing desires, goals and subject forms as unique to specific 'cultures' (Waggoner, 2005: 248) .
The implications for 'critique' that seem to ensue from Mahmood's perspective have also been addressed (Waggoner, 2005; Ismail, 2006 Ismail, , 2007 . Ismail (2006: 604), for instance, commends Mahmood for 'suspending judgement derived from her feminist ideas', but nevertheless calls for a more 'critical assessment of the political implications of certain types of claims to truth'. It is not my point here to try and settle the important epistemological, normative and political questions that arise here, but rather to engage with Mahmood's perspective to further explore conceptions of self and religious practice among young Muslim women in Norway, and to question the secular-liberal premises that seem largely to be taken for granted in existing analyses of such conceptions and practice.
killing desires and working on the self Of importance, they agreed, was 'controlling nafs' [wilful self, see below] and 'trampling on your ego' so as to achieve a balance between the different dimensions of the self. Noor talked about how important it was to work with the self, with the inner consciousness, and to always bear in mind Allah and Islamic prescriptions and proscriptions, and how this would ensure both happiness in this life and in the hereafter.
Alesha intervened, arguing that it is difficult to find a balance: 'When you eat, work, or read -everything you do is supposed to reflect your iman. At the same time you're not supposed to be absorbed exclusively by Allah day and night.
You're also supposed to go about your daily tasks in a proper way'. [...] a theory that humans possess two important faculties: 'aql, the faculty of moral discrimination shared with the angels, on the one hand, and nafs the self in the sense of the will or, more typically wilful principle, on the other. Both, generally speaking, are expected to coexist. Man's realization comes through cultivation of 'aql and the consequent disciplining of the nafs. One seeks to refine, not destroy, the nafs. It is the very tension, the process of discrimination, the fact that there are choices to be made and control to be exercised, that gives man's life its value. It is this, not holy war, that is the 'greater' jihad:
unceasing effort to discriminate the boundaries set forth in the Quran and relentless self-control in eschewing excess and living within them. (Metcalf, 1984: 10) Janice Boddy's (1989) work from Hofriyat in Southern Sudan similarly discusses how, as is common in many Muslim societies, all persons are conceived as being composed of three vital essences, ruh (soul), nafs (animal life force including lusts and desires) and *aql (reason, rationality, control of emotions and the ability to behave in socially appropriate ways). All persons have ruh, but in the Hofriyat context men develop laql to a considerably greater extent than women.
In an article about immigrant youth, freedom, power and resistance the Norwegian anthropologist Inger Lise Lien (2003) argues that Muslim ideas of the moral soul (ruh9) represent the force of parental and male control against the individual freedom of youth and in particular girls. In Lien's interpretation, the control of the moral soul over nafs amounts to a subjugation of the ego to the superego; the norms of (patriarchal) society, codified and understood as God's will.10 My purpose here is not to assess Lien's argument as such, but rather to point to a particular understanding of the self, which underpins her argument. Muslim ideas of the moral soul are in Lien's account constructed as a counterpoint to the authentic and autonomous 'true self' and 'finding one's true self' is presented as the capacity to realize one's own interests and desires against power, whether it be in the form of the weight of custom, tradition, transcendental will or parental control. The (moral) self is thus pitted against the social and desires are naturalized as expressions of an unmediated autonomous will pertaining to the 'authentic self'.11 In Lien's account, agency is attributed to those who 'resist' and 'rebel' (against imprisoning traditions); they are described as in a process of liberation; they want to 'find themselves' and 'own themselves', realizing a 'constructive creativity' (Lien, 2003: 327) . Those who do not 'resist' or 'rebel' appear to be controlled almost entirely from the outside, and in so far as they are attributed any agency at all, it is one of selfcontrol that secures their own oppression rather than their 'self-realization'.
Unlike Lien, Borchgrevink and Brochmann (2009) articulated by the young women is informed by multiple religious, philosophical and psychological discourses, the young women converge on the understanding that being Muslim implies that there is a certain mode of being that one should seek to achieve, and that this mode requires an effort on the part of the individual to work with herself. Whether this effort is seen as strenuous or less so, differs. The 'techniques of the self' that the young women stress for realizing this mode of being are also numerous, including; meditation, contemplation, remembering Allah, prayer, living your everyday life within the limits of what is halal, love of God, the eschatological fear of God and the Day of Judgement, and trying to obtain a pure intention in your acts. 'A/afs', 'ego', 'lust' and 'desire' are singled out as domains of the self that these practices are directed at, and they incite and call upon themselves and each other to recognize the moral obligation to submit to the 'will of Allah', to realize that 'I'm working for God'. The young women also negotiate the separation of 'faith' from 'everyday life' -as in Safa's stress on integrating faith and quotidian life as a modality of acting in the world (in a way that is halal). She thus questions the relegation of Islam to a purely 'ritual' and 'spiritual' sphere, and stresses its concrete bearings on the practices and routines of daily life.
A decisive role is also attributed to the acquisition of religious knowledge in order to know 'what God wants from me' and to shape your self in accordance (Taylor, 1989 (Taylor, , 1994 with this will. This stress on the acquisition of knowledge was, as has also been underlined in other studies of young pious Muslim women in Europe (jouili and Amir-Moazami, 2006; Minganti, 2007; Fadil, 2008; Jouili, 2008) , largely effectuated through the idea of an individual and personal search for truth.
The women's desire to 'learn about Islam' in order to better 'understand' was paralleled by their critiques of their parents' generation, in particular, their supposed 'traditional', 'non-reflexive' emulation of religious practices (jacobsen, 2002; 2004; 2006) . However, the young women, like Alesha, also stressed the significance of obedience to principles that they could not 'fully understand'.
The idea of having a 'weak' and 'unstable' iman was intimately related to the failure to achieve the attitude of obedience that God requires of those faithful to him (as in Aadila's suggestion that Alesha had not properly submitted herself and needs to understand that she is 'working for God').
While the construction of the self as something that needs to be disciplined and controlled seems to contradict self-realization understood as autonomy and authenticity, the picture gets more complex when we pay attention to the way in which the young women talk about desire. The self that emerges from the conversation is a site of shifting desires that do not express an autonomous will or authentic self. As we saw above, the young women saw desires for 'un-lslamic things' as products of the 'materialist' and 'egoist' world they lived in, and argued that if these desires had become a 'part of your personality', they could be hard to change.13 Changing one's personality required vigilance and consciousness of one's acts as well as knowledge of 'what God wants from me'. If this was successful, piety could eventually become part of one's 'faith' and 'personality'. The self that the young Muslim women seek to discipline is a self that has been led away from its nature ( deen-al-fitra ), and in which socialization and the social context of materialism and egoism produced a set of 'un-lslamic desires'. Disciplining nafs is thus not about being prevented from 'realizing one's true self', but about realizing a self that is truly Muslim. Each person is seen as responsible for acquiring knowledge of Islam, for following the moral codes of Islam, and for intents, as well as for their acts. While the stress is thus on obedience to God's will, and on embodying Islamic norms, resisting the 'cultural traditions' of the parents and the norms of majority society becomes necessary when such traditions and norms prevent self-realization as a true Muslim, for example through the production of 'un-lslamic desires'.
If disciplining nafs is analysed within the grammar of concepts about the self in which it appears rather than as a subjection of the ego to the superego, or of the autonomous and authentic self to the norms of society, it does seem to point instance, a central part of disciplining nafs had been to work on purifying her intentions,15 so that she would not act piously in order to gain praise and recognition from her social environment but to 'submit' and realize the exemplary model of the pious self. She thus engaged in a scrutinizing of, and effort to rearrange, her inner motivations. Her acts in this respect are not directed towards 'emancipation' or 'resistance', but towards developing the skills and capacities necessary for undertaking particular kinds of moral action (Foucault, 1997; Mahmood, 2005) . The reworking of intentions and disciplining of nafs was central not only to the individual's realization of the pious self but also to the arrangement of social relationships. In the context of the mixed-gender organizations the women belonged to, the motivations of members were central to negotiations of norms of gender separation. Gender-mixing was not perceived as counter to piety as long as people's intentions were to work for God and not to date and flirt.
The question nevertheless remains how piety relates to gender. How do young
Norwegian Muslim men relate to norms, to others and to themselves as desiring subjects, and how do they shape themselves as (pious) Muslims? Just like the young women quoted above, several of the young men talked about the struggle to control nafs , not least in relation to interaction with the opposite sex.
However, while young men and young women were equally concerned with controlling their desires and working on themselves as moral agents, they tended to construct women more as the objects of (sexual) desire and men as the desiring subjects. Through acting piously (e.g. wearing a hijab, lowering their gaze, etc.) the women were concerned both with controlling their own desires and with avoiding arousing (sexual) desire in their male colleagues. While the young men also performed a work on the self to shape themselves as pious Muslims, they were not subject to the same standards of guilt and sin as the young women.
This was often spoken of by the young as a 'double standard' that gave women the main burden and responsibility for guaranteeing social morality. While most of the young women, like Adeela, avoided dating on the grounds that it was counter to Islamic norms, more of the young men did date (mainly non-Muslim or non-pious Muslim) girls, although often with a 'bad conscience' or by assuring themselves that the way they did it remained within the 'limits' of Islamic norms.
Gender thus importantly structures the agency involved in shaping the self as a pious Muslim.
ethics of authenticity and autonomy
The case I have discussed attests to the importance of exploring the different ways in which desire is socially constructed, and how it relates to different conceptualizations of self and self-fulfilment. However, it would be a mistake to see the kind of relationship that the young women I worked with had to is not contrary to 'having fun'. To have made a 'choice' was seen to secure the legitimacy of religious practice as a true sign of obedience to Allah, to be distinguished from obedience that emerged rather from social conformity or pressure, unreflexive traditional practice and acceptance of the authority of parents or imams. 'Choice' was thus constructed as intrinsic to their moral agency as Muslims; 'obeying Allah' was an act of faithfulness and worship only to the extent that it was 'willed'. But choice was also constructed as necessary for the individual to stay 'truthful to themselves'. For instance, the hijab, while acknowledged to be a practice geared at shaping a self that is 'working for God', was also assessed in terms of an ethics of personal authenticity and autonomy, as an expression of 'who I am', and 'who I choose to be'.
In particular, relations to the parental generation were negotiated through an ethics of autonomy and freedom. Noor, for instance, deplored the fact that her parents were so strict with her little sister when it came to clothing and out-of-school activities that they caused her to 'rebel' and turn away from home, Noor explained, but it was just to get the parents off her back. The young women agreed that trying to coerce children and youth into religious observation was wrong (and also counter-productive as it would cause people to 'rebel'), 20 and that a person's individual choice should be respected. Parents could of course legitimately try to guide their children, but this should be done through teaching them and 'explaining' to them so that they themselves chose to do the right thing.21 Coercion was regularly portrayed as something of 'the past' -associated with 'tradition' or 'culture', while 'individual freedom' was viewed as modern and advanced -associated with 'authenticated Islam' (Deeb, 2006: 21) .
In particular with respect to issues concerning gender and sexual morality, the 'parental generation' and their 'culture' and 'traditions' often represented the 'other' against which the young women's own subject position was constructed.
While the experience of homely coercion was central to how some spoke about their upbringing during our interviews and in discussions with other young people, others acclaimed how their parents had 'given them a lot of freedom' and 'always let them make their own choices'. However, 'modernity' was not seen as guaranteeing individual freedom in itself, as they also deplored the 'peerpressure' of youth culture, that made juggling the demands from home and school so difficult to Noor's little sister, and that prevented her from 'being herself'. While the discussion among the young women quoted earlier focused on crafting the self through submission and obedience to (religious) norms, issues related to gender and intergenerational dynamics, in particular, portrayed the self as needing to be crafted 'against' social norms represented by the 'parental generation' and the 'youth culture' (yet, one could argue, through subjection to normative ideals of self-fulfilment through choice).
This very brief discussion can only hint at how a liberal understanding of freedom (as autonomy and authenticity) importantly shapes how young Muslims in Norway relate to themselves and others. In contrast to Lien, I do not see the young women's concern with autonomy and authenticity as a sign of their 'liberation' from oppressive traditions and social structures, or as a guarantee of their 'creative agency'. Rather, as I have argued elsewhere, (Jacobsen, 2010) it manifests the effects of a particular form of liberal governance, a particular mode of relating to the self in which the individual is responsible for creating his/ her own identity and future and where the value of autonomy and free choice serves as a basis for evaluating the good, moral person (Rose, 1996; Asad, 2003; Mahmood, 2005; Brown, 2006 language of authenticity and autonomy. Given that, as I have argued above, young Muslims are positioned at the intersection of different, ambivalent and sometimes contrasting discourses and traditions, it is not possible to see the 'self' they relate to and work on as reflecting one particular and integrated cultural or religious understanding of self and personhood. This also complicates the notions of 'self-realization', which does not unfold within a single teleology or discursive formation. While anthropological studies of different cultural notions of self and personhood have been criticized for assuming a homogenous notion of a self that is coextensive with a given culture, structure or temporality, Mahmood (2005: 120) emphasizes that different configurations of personhood cohabit the same cultural and historical space, and that each configuration is a product of a specific discursive formation rather than of the culture at large. (Mahmood, 2005; Brown, 2006; Butler, 2008) . My intention has not been to resolve this tension, but to sustain a discussion of the questions it raises for the practice of anthropological and feminist theory. 
